Iran Remains an Obstacle to the ‘Greater Israel’ Project

Ahead of the deadline set by United States President Donald Trump for Iran last week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made an urgent call to the White House. He warned the president against pursuing a ceasefire with Tehran.
After the temporary truce was announced, Netanyahu was quick to clarify that the Israeli army would not cease its operations in Lebanon. Many interpreted his actions as an attempt to ensure his own political survival by prolonging the conflict.
However, it is not only Netanyahu and his allies who desire the US to continue the war with Iran; his opponents share this sentiment. This is because the Israeli political and security elites view Iran’s defeat as a crucial step towards realizing the “Greater Israel” project.
“Greater Israel” has evolved into a Zionist political strategy that extends beyond the Talmudic vision of a Jewish state situated between the Euphrates and the Nile. To achieve this, Israel is pursuing not only the occupation of more land but also military dominance over vast areas of the Middle East, alongside ever-expanding spheres of influence. Iran has consistently obstructed all these objectives.
Border Expansions
At the core of the “Greater Israel” vision lies territorial expansion. For decades, Israel has been involved in the colonization of Palestinian territory occupied in 1967, which is now widely perceived as de facto annexed. The Palestinian population in these areas faces a looming “transfer.”
Having secured control over Palestinian land, Israel is now looking to expand north, east, and south. Its territorial ambitions align with plans proposed by the World Zionist Organization in 1919, which encompassed parts of southern Lebanon and Syria, the left bank of the Jordan River (in present-day Jordan), and portions of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula.
Israel has occupied and colonized Syria’s Golan Heights for nearly 60 years, and over the past two years, it has sought to acquire more Syrian territory. Expansion to the north and south of the Golan Heights would improve access to water resources and bolster Israel’s strategic position overlooking Damascus. Such a presence could subject the Syrian capital to sustained military pressure, potentially forcing the Syrian regime to seek political accommodation to maintain stability.
Southern Lebanon is a territory Israel has long aimed to control and has repeatedly invaded. Its army currently occupies the area and has begun obliterating villages to prevent the return of their inhabitants. The region is strategic not only because of its mountainous terrain but also its valuable water resources.
Israel also desires the East Bank of the Jordan River for both economic and strategic reasons. Establishing control over this area would not only increase access to arable land but also provide greater strategic depth against potential eastern threats, historically linked to Iraq and Iran. Furthermore, control over this region would place key regional transit routes under Israeli influence, especially those connecting the Arabian Peninsula to the eastern Mediterranean.
Collectively, these expansionist scenarios would grant Israel enhanced access to strategic waterways like the Red Sea and proximity to major energy resources. This, in turn, could significantly boost its geopolitical leverage in shaping regional dynamics.
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Military Dominance
The “Greater Israel” project is not solely about territorial expansion; it also encompasses establishing regional control to ensure the freedom to conduct military operations with minimal constraints. This mirrors Israel’s actions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 1948, in Lebanon since September 2024, and in Syria since the collapse of the al-Assad regime in December 2024.
In this context, “dominance” implies the capacity to act unilaterally and project force across borders. Israel seeks freedom of operation not only over its neighboring states – Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon – but also over Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, the Gulf states, and even parts of the Horn of Africa, such as Somalia.
Israel has made progress on this aspect of the project by employing force against its neighbors. It has also finalized various peace and security agreements with countries in the Eastern Mediterranean.
A significant step was also its successful lobbying effort to be moved under the jurisdiction of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), which covers the Middle East, instead of the US European Command. Joining CENTCOM granted Israel access to Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems within the region, facilitating its warplanes’ operations across it.
Moving forward, to achieve regional military dominance, Israel could leverage normalization agreements that include military cooperation clauses. This might involve basing Israeli warplanes in United States and United Kingdom facilities in the region and potentially securing its own bases in Arab countries.
Such arrangements could be justified under security and military collaboration, granting Israel the ability to launch preemptive attacks against perceived imminent threats. This would also encompass demilitarized zones equipped with Early Warning Systems (EWS) and intelligence facilities.
Similar mechanisms already exist in the Sinai Peninsula under the Camp David Accords. The agreement serves Israel’s security interests by maintaining a demilitarized buffer zone, imposing limits on Egyptian forces, including airspace restrictions, and sustaining the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), which provides an early-warning system.
Current negotiations with the emerging Syrian leadership appear to be aimed at establishing a comparable security arrangement.
Intelligence infrastructure may also be embedded within surveillance and cloud-based technologies offered to Arab countries, with data processing linked to Israeli-controlled systems.
Sphere of Influence
The third element of the “Greater Israel” project involves establishing a geopolitical sphere of influence. Within this strategy, Israel aims to become a pivotal actor in shaping the domestic politics of countries it perceives as falling within this sphere.
In doing so, it seeks to emulate historical great powers, such as colonial Britain. Over the past two years, Israel has tested elements of this approach in Lebanon, where it has actively sought to shape the political landscape and government formation by leveraging military pressure and empowering groups more amenable to accepting Israeli political arrangements.
Israel aims to expand its sphere of influence primarily by leveraging US soft and hard power projection in the region. The pro-Israel lobby in Washington has successfully integrated Israeli regional interests into US foreign policy concerning the Middle East.
US military and financial support for several states in the region has been conditional on their acceptance of Israeli dictates in regional affairs.
International organizations dominated by the US have also played a role, alongside financial networks that influence credit markets. Through US and major investment bodies, pressure can be exerted on states to adopt certain policies, aligning them more closely with Israeli strategic interests.
Iran as a Barrier
Over the past few decades, Israel has systematically removed various obstacles to its “Greater Israel” project. Iran has remained one of the last standing.
In this sense, reports in US media indicating Israel’s key role in convincing the US to initiate war on Iran are unsurprising. What proved unexpected – at least for the Israeli government – was the extent to which it underestimated Iranian resilience.
A month and a half into the conflict, Iran has achieved a geopolitical victory by consolidating itself as a dominant regional power. It has tightened its grip over the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20 percent of global oil supplies pass.
Israel’s failure to defeat Iran – even with full US backing – represents a major setback for its “Greater Israel” strategy. The war has exposed Israeli dependence on external support: It required direct US involvement to defend against Iranian missile attacks, while lacking the independent capacity to wage a large-scale offensive. This raises serious doubts about Israel’s ability to pursue its expansionist ambitions autonomously.
The consequences of this war extend beyond the Israel-Iran confrontation. The recklessness of the Israeli government is likely to alter strategic thinking among other regional players, who have, until now, been Iran’s rivals. While Israel’s objective in launching the war on Iran was to clear the path for its regional hegemony, it may soon find itself confronting much stiffer and broader regional resistance than that posed by Iran’s “axis of resistance.”
The US itself may also become an impediment – or at least refuse to provide unconditional assistance as it has done thus far. Poll after poll reveals dramatic shifts in US public opinion regarding Israel, with negative attitudes reaching historic highs.
This could undermine the Israeli lobby’s ability to influence Washington in Israel’s favor. The upcoming midterms in 2026 and the presidential and congressional elections in 2028 could introduce more critics of Israel into the US legislature, severely curbing US support for Israel, particularly its offensive actions.
The window for realizing the “Greater Israel” project with US support may be shrinking, which could lead to more desperate and risky Israeli actions in the coming months and years.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
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