Can Pakistan Balance US-Iran Mediation with Saudi Defense Commitments?

In Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 11, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met with United States Vice President JD Vance. They held discussions on the sidelines of the most significant direct negotiations between Washington and Tehran since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
Almost simultaneously, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defense issued a contrasting announcement.
A statement from the state-owned Saudi Press Agency confirmed that a Pakistani military contingent had arrived at King Abdulaziz Air Base in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. This deployment falls under the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) signed the previous year.
The statement detailed that the deployment included fighter and support aircraft from the Pakistan Air Force, with the goal of enhancing joint military coordination and improving operational readiness between the two nations.
In the two days following this announcement, Pakistan’s government has remained silent on the development. Al Jazeera’s requests for comment to the military’s media wing (Inter-Services Public Relations – ISPR), the Ministry of Information, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs went unanswered.
The Saudi announcement immediately highlighted Pakistan’s precarious balancing act amidst a war that has destabilized the global economy, caused attacks and fatalities in several countries, and now involves a high-stakes escalation between the US and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz.
On one hand, Islamabad has played a crucial role as a mediator between the US and Iran, hosting their delegations last Saturday and pushing for continued talks following a breakdown in negotiations.
On the other hand, the SMDA signifies Pakistan’s commitment to militarily support a vital ally, Saudi Arabia, which faced repeated attacks from Iran before the ceasefire, with Tehran offering no assurances against future strikes on Saudi Arabia or other Gulf nations.
For now, Pakistani officials assert their ability to manage both roles simultaneously.
A Pakistani official, who wished to remain anonymous, stated that Islamabad is dedicated to facilitating the process for as many rounds as necessary, noting that diplomatic contact among all parties is ongoing.
Prime Minister Sharif is anticipated to visit Saudi Arabia in the coming days, with potential trips to other regional countries like Turkiye, as Islamabad aims to maintain diplomatic momentum ahead of the ceasefire deadline.
However, with a US naval blockade of Iranian ports now active and the ceasefire brokered by Islamabad between Washington and Tehran expiring on April 22, Pakistan’s balancing act faces increasing complexity.
Deepening Ties with Riyadh
The SMDA lies at the core of this delicate tightrope walk.
A day before the Islamabad talks commenced, Saudi Finance Minister Mohammed bin Abdullah Al-Jadaan paid a brief visit to Islamabad, meeting Prime Minister Sharif at his official residence. Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar and Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir were also in attendance.
An official statement indicated that Sharif conveyed his appreciation for Riyadh’s “longstanding economic and financial support” to Pakistan, acknowledging its crucial role in stabilizing the nation’s economy.
The visit highlighted the extensive nature of the Pakistan-Saudi relationship, encompassing defense, diplomacy, and finance.
The SMDA was signed on September 17, 2025, at Al-Yamamah Palace in Riyadh by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Sharif, with Munir also present. This agreement obligates both countries to consider any act of aggression against one as an act against both.
Pakistan’s stance on the agreement has remained consistent.
Addressing the Senate on March 3, three days after the conflict began, Dar explicitly stated that Pakistan has a defense pact with Saudi Arabia, adding, “and the whole world knows about it.”
He further mentioned that he had personally communicated Pakistan’s obligations under the pact to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, clarifying the agreement’s implications.
Sharif likewise pledged Pakistan’s unwavering support for the kingdom and its people.
What remains ambiguous are the specific conditions under which either Pakistan or Saudi Arabia would be expected to come to the other’s defense. Would a formal declaration of war against another country be required? Would a specific request for military intervention be necessary? Has Saudi Arabia, to date, refrained from formally requesting Pakistan’s defense assistance?
Analysts suggest that the actions taken by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to demonstrate the SMDA’s operational status are intended to send clear messages to other nations. Simultaneously, the ambiguity surrounding the deal’s specific contents acts as a deterrent, leaving potential adversaries of Saudi Arabia uncertain about when they might also face Pakistan’s military power.
It’s important to note that Pakistan has a long-standing military presence in the Arab world. Pakistani pilots served with Arab air forces during the 1967 Six-Day War, and Pakistani forces have been deployed in various capacities across the Middle East since the 1960s.
In Saudi Arabia, Pakistan has trained thousands of military personnel since 1967. A formal agreement in 1982 institutionalized the deployment of Pakistani armed forces for training purposes.
During the 1970s and 1980s, substantial numbers of Pakistani troops were stationed in the kingdom, including for the protection of oil infrastructure in the Eastern Province, the very region where the current deployment is located.
Nevertheless, the SMDA marks the first pact that formally commits Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to consider an attack on one as an attack on the other.
Walking a Tightrope
Azeema Cheema, founding director of Islamabad-based Verso Consulting, suggested that the invocation of the SMDA reflects a specific strategic calculation.
“The invocation of the SMDA is the price for the significant restraint demonstrated by the Saudis throughout this conflict,” she informed Al Jazeera. “This was likely pre-agreed with the Saudis before the [US-Iran] talks, when Pakistan conveyed its strongest displeasure to the Iranians.”
She added that Saudi Arabia seems to be “adopting a long-term perspective on its security partnership with Pakistan, addressing all threats to its territorial sovereignty, whether originating from Iran or Israel.”
Concurrently, Pakistan hosts no US military bases and lacks diplomatic relations with Israel, factors which Cheema believes help maintain its credibility with Tehran.
“The Iranians will understand that Pakistan has no desire to engage in combat against Iran,” she stated. “They will be cautious that Pakistan is not neutral if Iran and Saudi Arabia become co-belligerents, but will also recognize that Pakistan’s initial approach will be through mediation.”
Umer Karim, an associate fellow at the Riyadh-based King Faisal Center for Islamic Research and Studies, commented that Pakistan’s approach involves both logical reasoning and inherent risks.
“Pakistan is navigating a tightrope concerning both its self-assumed mediation responsibilities and its defense commitments to Saudi Arabia,” he told Al Jazeera.
Karim noted that Islamabad seems to have calculated its ability to sustain both roles, leveraging its SMDA commitments to gain influence over Iran and deter further attacks on Saudi installations.
“This strategy might be effective as long as US-Iran talks or engagement persist,” he remarked, “but should hostilities resume, this strategy could fail, potentially drawing Pakistan fully into the conflict.”
This is one reason, the Middle East expert added, why Pakistani officials are likely to prioritize maintaining the current arrangement for as long as feasible.
“The continuation of US-Iran talks is paramount for Pakistan,” Karim emphasized.
Sina Azodi, an assistant professor of Middle East politics at George Washington University, presented a more optimistic perspective.
“I do not believe Pakistan will jeopardize its relationship with Iran, considering both religious ties and ethnic and linguistic affinity,” he informed Al Jazeera.
Azodi also proposed that the deployment might be directed elsewhere.
“I believe the Saudi decision to partner with Pakistan was aimed more at Israel than Iran,” he stated.
Limits of Balancing Roles
A former three-star Pakistani general, however, warned that Pakistan’s window for simultaneously acting as both a mediator and a Saudi military ally was limited.
“Pakistan can maintain both roles only if any military deployment remains strictly defensive, time-bound, and transparently limited. The moment the operational theater shifts to offensive actions, or the perception of offensive coordination arises, the dual role becomes untenable,” he stated anonymously.
He cited the long history of Pakistani deployments in Saudi Arabia as a factor that could influence Iran’s reaction.
“Iran’s perception, rather than Pakistan’s intent, will dictate whether trust endures,” he remarked. “However, Pakistan’s intent, in this specific instance, is supported by historical precedent.”
In Riyadh, the deployment has been characterized as a deterrent.
Faisal Alhamad, a retired Saudi brigadier general and military analyst, informed Independent Arabia that the move was “more a deterrence step than preparation for an attack on any party.”
Stationing aircraft in the Eastern Province, he explained, signals that Saudi Arabia’s most vulnerable areas are being strengthened. This province, which houses the majority of Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure, has been the primary target of Iran’s attacks on the kingdom during the conflict.
The Royal Saudi Air Force remains one of the region’s most potent aerial forces, operating over 200 F-15 variants—the second-largest fleet globally after the United States—alongside 72 Eurofighter Typhoons.
Some analysts speculated that the Pakistani deployment includes pilots, airmen, and ground technicians, although this could not be officially verified.
It also remains unclear whether Pakistani forces are operating under their own command structure or if they have been integrated into Saudi operational command.
Fragile Diplomacy
Since the American and Iranian delegations departed Islamabad on April 12 without reaching an agreement, the situation has become more precarious.
A US naval blockade of Iranian ports and coastal areas was implemented on April 14. Iran’s armed forces denounced it as “piracy,” asserting that the country’s ports are “either for everyone or for no one.”
Despite the breakdown, Pakistani officials indicate that Washington and Tehran remain in contact. Islamabad, officials state, has once again offered to host another round of talks, with the ceasefire holding until April 22.
Diplomatic channels between Riyadh and Tehran also continue to be open.
On April 9, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan held the first publicly announced call with his Iranian counterpart Araghchi since Iran initiated strikes against Gulf neighbors. They discussed methods to reduce tensions and restore stability.
A second call followed on April 13, concentrating on regional developments and the results of the Islamabad talks.
Analysts suggest that this continued contact indicates both sides have an interest in maintaining open communication channels, irrespective of their military postures.
“Any Iranian skepticism towards Pakistan can at least be mitigated by the certainty that Pakistan will prioritize regional stability above other interests,” Cheema concluded.
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